Dead Paypal Security Key

Just on the off chance someone else has the same problem … My PayPal security key is several years old and last night it finally quit. It flashed these messages when turned on:

88888888
(some gobbledygook strange characters)
batt  75
--E994--
Soft3328

I presume it means the battery was low, which wouldn’t be surprising. Well, should I just give it to my son to play with, or try to change the battery? I paid $5 for it but now they don’t even sell the key-chain model, and the credit-card model costs $30. Plus, I’m in Nigeria and it would take a good while to get a replacement.

I opened it up, which is fairly easy, and found a standard CR2032 lithium battery. I slid it out and slid in a new one. Uh oh, same error message! Well, let it sit for a while without the battery, I thought. So I took it out again, waited 5 minutes, then put the new one in. Now it just shows 88888888 no matter what! The button does nothing, the display does not turn off after a minute. Shorting some of the pads inside doesn’t do anything either. So now it’s no use even as a dumb toy.

It all makes sense, though. The key works by generating a 6 digit number every 30 seconds, and the number is verified by PayPal as belonging to your key. That means it’s tied to real clock time. If the battery is low and the unit thinks it may be unable to assure the accurate time, then it has to fail. Once that state has occurred, there should be no way to restore the correct state. Changing the battery doesn’t change the fact that the time has become suspect. Waiting 5 minutes before changing the battery probably put the key into a factory new state where it is waiting for programming.

Bottom line: If your security key fails, don’t bother trying to fix it. My own feeling is that it’s not worth $30 for the current credit-card-size key unless you have a weak password or are really careless with it, but then I might feel differently if I see a $3000 fraudulent charge on my account some day!

Create a high-security vault for your data in 5 minutes

In the last article, Protecting your sensitive data with TrueCrypt, I gave an overview of what Truecrypt can do for you: make an encrypted virtual hard drive, encrypt an entire partition, or encrypt an entire hard drive. This time, we'll see how to make the virtual hard drive in at most 5 minutes. Rather than write my own tutorial, I direct you to the step-by-step TrueCrypt Beginner's Tutorial with full screen shots.

Instead of another tutorial, I'll summarize the steps, add a note or two, and try to give a little more explanation of what is happening in this method.

Why use TrueCrypt?

First, why use Truecrypt rather than one of the many, many other encryption programs?

• Compatibility: TrueCrypt runs on Microsoft systems from Windows 2000 upward, on Mac OS X 10.4 and 10.5, and on Linux. (According to this Wikipedia article, only one of the other 45 disk encryption programs work on all three systems, and that one is not open source).
• Price: Free. Not shareware, not trial-ware, not "free download," but just free, period.
• Open source: This means that anyone can examine the program's instructions to see how it all works. This means that many people can be working on improvements and bug-fixing. More importantly, though, the transparency of open source makes it hard for any security flaws to remain undetected.
• Wide use. TrueCrypt is one of the most widely used encryption programs. The site reports over 10 million downloads to date.

That said, the most important thing is to protect your sensitive data somehow and to use a well-supported, respected encryption program. If you like experimenting, there are many programs out there. TrueCrypt can be a complicated program with all kinds of options, but it's quite easy to use the most important features.

Overview

Goal

What will you accomplish when you follow the tutorial?

• Within a few minutes, you will have a new "drive" M: on your computer where you can safely store sensitive information. You can use it like any other drive--create files, drag-and-drop files into our out of folders on the drive, even use a folder on the drive as your "My Documents" if you like.
• Though in action you see a new drive M:, all the data is kept in a container file that can only be unlocked ("mounted") using TrueCrypt and your passphrase.
• While your new drive is mounted, you will not know or care that your files are encrypted. When you turn off your computer or lock ("dismount") the drive, the data will be invisible, safe from any prying eyes.
• You can copy or move the entire encrypted drive, as a single file, to a different location such as a USB flash drive or another computer. This is good for backup.

Steps

Here's a high-level explanation of the 18 steps in the tutorial.

• Step 1: Download and install the program.
• Steps 2-12: Create the container file. This only has to be done once.
• Steps 13-18: Mount the container file for use. You do this every time you want to unlock and access your data.

Precautions

• You are making a data vault or safe, and your passphrase is the combination to the lock. There is no backup, no spare key or emergency button to use to recover your data if you lose or forget your passphrase. In most cases, it is probably best to record your passphrase somewhere safe rather then rely on your memory. Obviously, you don't want to keep it somewhere where a thief will see it, such as in your computer bag. Depending on your situation, you may not even want to keep it in writing in your home or office, but do consider keeping it somewhere.
• Putting your information onto an encrypted drive is only one part of security. Do not neglect other parts; a chain is as strong as its weakest link.

OK, let's do it

Now, go to the tutorial and follow it step by step, referring to these notes as you do.

• Step 1. Downloading and installing TrueCrypt. Ideally, you should download the program directly from TrueCrypt so that you get the most up-to-date, "pure" version.
• Steps 2-5. Telling TrueCrypt you want to create a virtual drive. Just click the buttons as shown, no choices to make here.
• Step 6. Specify location and name of container file. Attention: be sure to read the explanation in the tutorial. Although it might appear that you are to select an existing file to encrypt, this is not true. Rather you are giving the program the location and name of a file to create. This new file will be the "container" for your virtual drive. If you select an existing file, it will be erased, not encrypted!
• Steps 7-8. Having chosen a name for your container file, you just press "next" two times.
• Step 9. Tell TrueCrypt how big to make your virtual drive, how much data you will be able to store in it. TrueCrypt will create a container file of this size, so you will need at least that much free space in the location you have chosen. Don't make it too big if you plan to copy the entire thing onto a flash drive.
  Optional note: If you choose to make the container "dynamic" (Step 11), it is very small at first and only grows as you add files. In this case, the size you select in step 9 is the maximum size. If you do not make the container dynamic, then the container file will be this maximum size from the very beginning, even though it contains no data.
• Step 10. Choosing a passphrase. While you are just testing, you can use a simple passphrase. For serious use, however, be sure to read the guidelines about how to make a secure passphrase.
• Step 11. Select format type. Just follow the instructions, moving your mouse around randomly for a while to help make the encryption strong, then click Format.
  Optional note: For advanced use, you can use a format other than the default FAT. For large virtual drives in Windows, you might consider using NTFS.
• Step 12. Finishing up. Now the container file is ready to use.
• Steps 13-18. Mounting the container as a virtual hard drive. Although this occupies six steps in the tutorial, it is really simple. First, you choose a drive letter to assign to the new drive (step 13), then you tell TrueCrypt which container file to use (i.e., the one you just created) (steps 14-16). Finally, you enter your passphrase for that container file and mount it (steps 17-18).

At this point, your new drive M: is ready to use just like any other drive. Remember that you data is exposed as long as the drive is mounted; if someone steals the computer while you are working on it, M: will be unlocked until the computer is shut down. Depending on the situation, you may want to manually dismount it when you leave the computer or when you do not need to access the secure files.

Finally, read the small print at the end of the tutorial and realize that your original, unencrypted data is still present on your original drive even after you delete it--that's why file-recovery programs work. To permanently remove it, you need to use a disk wiping program with the option of erasing all unused disk space. See Purge Your Hard Drive for a good explanation. One wiping program is Heidi Computer's Eraser. Some others are reviewed in Best Free Secure Erase Utility.

Even then, how do you know that you have deleted all the files that contain sensitive data? What about backups, email folders, temporary files, obscure files in the Application Data folder, the paging and hibernation files? You really don't know. That's where whole disk encryption comes into play. It may seem a little scarier to think of altering your whole hard drive, but it's actually easier than making a virtual drive, and it eliminates all these residues of the information you want to protect. You will not need to worry about wiping or shredding your files, either. I'll cover whole disk encryption next time, in a much shorter article I hope!

Photo of safe by rpongsaj on Flickr, http://www.flickr.com/photos/pong/ / CC BY 2.0

Protecting your sensitive data with TrueCrypt

About two weeks ago, I finally took the big plunge and encrypted my laptop's entire hard drive. I knew in theory that it was a good security precaution, and in fact, our mission's IT policy requires hard drive encryption on all laptops. It's a policy that is still more honored in the breech than in practice. Why didn't I do it earlier?

Not that I've been totally slack about protecting my data. I've always kept my passwords and financial accounts encrypted. (Always? What about those home accounting programs--I know my Microsoft Money program opens without a password....) I don't think there is any sensitive information in my email folders, except that anyone successfully logging on to the computer could get enough information about me and my contacts to start lots of scams even without actually breaking into my email server. ("This is Pastor Jonah, friend of Mike, who you support. He's been in a bad accident and needs money for treatment. Please urgently send $1000 to this account number ...") The bottom line is that any unencrypted information on my computer is potentially exposed to anyone who steals or borrows my laptop.

But since I have a good password for even logging on to my laptop, no one should even get that far, right? Wrong. It's very easy to break into a Windows computer if you have physical access to it. Anyway, if the data is not encrypted, someone can take out the hard drive and read it on another operating system.

Last year, I finally installed TrueCrypt, an excellent, free encryption tool. TrueCrypt can work in three main ways:

• Create an encrypted virtual hard drive. Tell TrueCrypt where to put the file to contain the data, assign a pass phrase, and TrueCrypt creates new, encrypted volume ("hard drive") for you with the drive letter you choose, such as "T:". From then on, you can use it exactly like any other drive. As long as the volume is unlocked with your pass phrase, you can't even tell that the data is encrypted. Lock it again and the drive letter disappears, leaving only what looks like a file of random garbage.
• Encrypt a partition. Most hard drives these days are divided into different logical areas or partitions, each with its own drive letter ("C drive," "D drive," etc.). TrueCrypt encrypts all the data in the entire partition, making it inaccessible until you supply the pass phrase. This option allows you to keep some data unprotected and more sensitive data encrypted on a separate partition. Unless you encrypt the operating system partition (usually C: in Windows), you can still boot the computer without the password.
• Encrypt an entire drive. In this case, everything on the drive is encrypted and nothing can be accessed without the pass phrase. Nothing, that is, except the tiny boot program that loads enough TrueCrypt to get your password and unlock the drive for you. If you lose your pass phrase, there is no way you're going boot your system or recover your data, period.

Rather than encrypting my whole drive, I started with the first option--a virtual hard drive where I could keep my sensitive data. Next time I'll show just how easy it was.

How we use FrontlineSMS

Jos, Nigeria has been in the news recently because of riots in November that killed hundreds of people. This was the second such episode since 2001, and the situation remains tense. Besides this, violent crime has increased rapidly in the past 4 years, with frequent robberies by armed gangs of up to 20 or more men.

Part of our response as a group of missions in Jos has been to strengthen our communications network, and FrontlineSMS has become a key part of that network. The mobile phone is the basic means of communication in Jos, where there are few if any functioning land lines, and where Internet access is still expensive and spotty. During the November crisis, we noticed that voice calls on the mobile network rarely connected, probably because of congestion, while SMS messages got through well.

With FrontlineSMS, we have so far developed a system with these features:

• Anyone can text the system and receive a response with the current status message. In a crisis, this could contain warnings, instructions, announcements and so on.
• Besides this "on demand" capability, we keep one list of users ("text alerts") who receive broadcast alerts.
• Anyone can join the "text alerts" group by sending the request as a text message to the system. We ask people to send the message ".join " followed by their name. At this point, FrontlineSMS cannot automatically include the name when the phone number is added to a group, but we hope that could be added in the future.
• We maintain other user lists such as compound security leaders, crisis management team, and so on. Anyone can broadcast a message to the crisis management team by prefixing a text message with a code that causes FrontlineSMS to forward the message to team members.
• The system sends outgoing SMS message through the Internet when it is available. They're sent to the Clickatell, which routes them to the actual SMS network. Clickatell is is very fast and inexpensive. We can send about 80 messages per minute this way, far more than is currently possible if we were to send messages directly onto the mobile phone network.
• FrontlineSMS is compatible with many mobile phones and modems. We are using a Huawei E170 modem.

Real Life Examples

Fortunately, we have not had actual rioting since we set up the system. However, there have been times when it has been very useful to send warnings and to raise the alert level. Here are some actual examples:

@Alerts: Jos is tense, please avoid downtown today.

@Security: X and Y have been robbed tonight & report the robbers took their Toyota Land cruiser and muttered something about Hillcrest on the way out.

@Alerts 20Feb 655pm. Serious rioting reported in Bauchi. No problems in Jos. Obey curfew, avoid areas that could be troublesome.

22 Feb 8am. *** Rioting on Friday Bauchi, churches & mosques burned. Now controlled. Keep on alert. Report signif news this num or ur security rep.

SecGrp: Some rumors are going around about unrest planned for Friday, .... Email or txt me if you know more. --Mike

Effectiveness

The system has worked quite well. The most serious limitations have been

• The interfaces (modem and Internet) have had a tendency to lock up, failing to receive messages, and have to be re-initialized manually.
• Message delivery is sometimes delayed for hours, occasionally more than a day. This is a fault of the local network and has nothing to do with FrontlineSMS or Clickatell.

Summary

FrontlineSMS has served us very well as a well to communicate quickly by SMS. We would recommend it for others in similar situations.

Disaster Avoided -- A Corrupted Microsoft Access Database File

I had a near miss today, almost losing my main address list, which I keep in Microsoft Access. I haven't used it in quite a while, as I have another list of recent address changes, but it's still my most comprehensive list of mailing addresses. When I tried to open it today, I got a message that it was in an "inconsistent state" and Access would try to repair it. Next, an error message that it "can't be repaired" or "isn't a Microsoft Office Access Database File."

I tried using my backup copies, but they had the same problem. It has been very long--4 years!--since I've put backups onto CDs or DVDs, simply because it takes so many of them, and have been relying mainly on one or two levels of medium term backups on an external hard drive.

Of course, this is far better than nothing, but the risk is just what I encountered today: having a file lost or corrupted and not knowing about it until the last "good" backup is gone. The same can happen with a virus. If you are keeping system backups but a virus has silently infected your machine, it could happen that all your backups are infected by the time you discover the problem.

I tried the solutions I found on the Microsoft site and by Googling, but they didn't work. The main thing I learned was that when your Access database is corrupted, there is a good chance that it's not something you can repair on your own. There are professionals who will do it, and some commercial programs. I tried one program, Advanced Access Repair, which quickly showed me that my data was recoverable. I was all ready to pay the $29.99 price of the program to actually recover the data, then noticed that the price is really $299.99. Oops.

Happily for me, the next program I tried was MDB Repair Tool, by Skysof, and it promptly repaired the database without my having to answer any questions or try different options. It just worked. To my surprise, this "trial" version actually recovered all the data for me for free, and I still have 58 more uses before I have to register. What a deal!

Lessons learned:

• If you can't or don't want to save full backups to long-term media (DVD, CD, tape, or online), then you should at least save your most important data that way once in a while. This method is risky because you might miss data you should have backed up, but at least you will have most of what you need. (Be sure to include your email in your backup; it may not be included if you're not careful).
• My address list doesn't need to be kept only in an Access database. I could periodically backup the actual address information so a simple text file. Then, if I lost the Access file, at least I would have the essential data.
• Hopefully I won't ever have to repair another Access database, but if I do, MDB Repair Tool will be the first thing I try.
Technorati Tags: backup,security,data,database,Access,tools,recovery,repair

Don't neglect online backups

A week ago, one of my friends was mugged on his way home from school on a bike path. He was badly beaten and ended up unconscious in the hospital. Though his bike, computer and some other things were stolen, and despite his injuries, I suspect that his most serious loss is much of the work he had done on a masters thesis. Apparently any backups he had were also stolen.

It's one thing to lose your most recent work, and losing your whole email store can be serious. But what if you lose something you've been working on for years--that book you're writing, a carefully compiled bibliography, your research data, a major proposal for your organization? It's almost unthinkable, yet it happens. Data loss is sure to happen if you have no backup strategy, but it can happen even if you do have backups. For example

• Backups may be lost along with your computer in a fire, theft, evacuation and so on
• Backup media may fail or be destroyed. Here in Nigeria, at least, flash drives have a high failure rate. CDs and DVDs can be scratched or damaged by sunlight and heat.
• If your original data becomes corrupted and you don't immediately know it, you may store the corrupted data in the backups.
• When do yo discover that your backup is damaged or corrupted? That's right, you discover it when you need it because your original data is lost.

For these reasons, it is important to have more than one level of backup for any data that is important to you. For any data that is really important, you should have at least two and preferably three backups stored in a way that they cannot be lost simultaneously. For example, you could keep one copy on a hard drive at work, one copy on a flash drive or re-writable CD at home, and one copy online.

In my last post, I briefly mentioned that one use of Dropbox was backing up your data online. Online backup should be more than an afterthought--it should be an important part of your backup strategy. Most of us in Africa do not have the luxury of a low-cost Internet connection that will let us back up all our data, let alone the whole system, but we can back up what is most important. Apart from multimedia files (video, pictures, music), your most important data, what you've actually invested the most time on, is probably a few hundred megabytes at most. You should at least consider saving some or all of it online.

There are many online data storage services, including a fair number of free ones. I like Dropbox--it works for me--but another solution might work better for you. One thing I like about Dropbox is that it keeps previous versions of changed and deleted files. That feature has already saved me a couple of times.

David Bradley's article "Make SkyDrive a Virtual Drive" describes the free Microsoft SkyDrive online service and add-ons that make it more useful and transparent. Some people send their important documents to their own online email addresses (a Gmail account, for example). It's not the simplest or most secure method, but it's a lot better than nothing.

Don't Rely on Password Managers to Keep you Safe on Untrusted Computers

In my previous post on password managers, I concluded that they can help you by "remembering" strong, hard-to-guess passwords for your different online accounts (or for other personal information). Actually, though, I started investigating these programs with a specific need in mind: to find a way to use my private accounts on untrusted computers such as public computers (airports, libraries, cybercafes) or your friend's computer if you aren't sure about the security it has.

In my post "Danger Ahead: Using the Cybercafe," I talked about the dangers of public computers, especially the fact that they can capture what you type including your user names, account numbers, and passwords, then pass that information along to cybercriminals. What good is a cybercafe if I can't trust it enough to log into my email account, for example? I looked into the password managers hoping that they would protect my information on public computers, but unfortunately my conclusion is that they do not. There is a ray of hope in another sort of solution, kyps, which I will mention later.

Can Password Managers Keep you Safe on Untrusted Computers?

Short answer: no. You should not use your personal data on an untrusted computer, even by way of a secure password manager. The kyps approach is more promising, but using your own (clean) computer is still the safest.

Long answer: no, though a password manager might reduce the risk somewhat. The problem in a nutshell is that, in principle, an untrusted computer and do anything with the data that goes through it. Theoretically, for example, someone could design a program from scratch that looks and acts just like Windows but also stores and forwards all personal information to the RBN (Russian Business Network) or other cybercrime center. There is simply no way to make an untrusted computer into a secure one.

Passpack is one of the two online password managers I reviewed. When I asked the company about this issue, this is what they said:

Yes, you're absolutely correct. The decrypted pack is used by (thus temporarily stored in) the javascript DOM. So any application that can access that DOM, can access the information stored in the decrypted pack.

As you noted, local memory is an issue with any program, online or off. Unfortunately, for as much as we can do to protect your account, you need to make sure you are on a clean computer. We have written one post to this effect here: http://passpack.wordpress.com/2008/07/23/travelers-check-your-browsers/

If I understand correctly, since Passpack stores your data in a single pack which it decrypts on your local computer, not only the passwords you use in a session but all your data is exposed this way, which would be dangerous on an untrusted machine.

Security expert Keith Bergen says,

In order for the passwords to be transmitted they have to pass through memory unencrypted so after they're sent to the other side the site can run a hash (md5, or what ever) against the plain text password to compare it to the hash that it stores. There are a few pieces of software that will look for passwords in memory as that is one of the best places to lift them from. ...

There are methods of stripping out the local SSL cert that your computer uses to initiate the SSL communication with the server and to copy and decode all SSL traffic that is sent to and from your computer. There are many Linux programs that do this and I have heard of some Windows implementations as well.

Bergen goes on to say that the practical implications of these issues are less clear. Even though methods exist to steal you credentials in these ways, we don't know how widespread they are. One thing is sure, though, and that is that the cybercriminals are sophisticated, motivated and bright. If it becomes cost effective for them to steal your identity in this way, then they will. So, although some of these managers may in some cases be better than nothing, their security is not something to, so to speak, put your money on. (And note that they may be worse than nothing as in the case of Passpack).

The author of kyps, Andreas Pashalidis, also discusses the risks of using password managers as well as other methods of trying to make a public computer safe. He points out that malware on the computer might not only capture your passwords, but also corrupt the data on your flash drive (if that's what you use) or infect the drive with malware making it unsafe to use even on your own computer.

Conclusion

In the end, I would not want to use any password manager on an untrusted computer, that is one that I am not reasonably sure is free of malware. In a situation where I had no alternative but to use an untrusted computer (suppose I was dying and stranded in a Somali village with no cell phones but with a cybercafe), I would either type in the credentials by hand or use a password manager, then change them as soon as possible and watch for any suspicious activity. However, there is a better approach, which is kyps, discussed in the next post (or just go there and have a look).

Password Managers: Brief review of three good products

PassPack list of passwords and automatic logins

In two previous posts (here and here), I looked at the security problems of using a public computer such as one at a cybercafe. Living in Africa, and in a country whose name is almost synonymous with scams, we need to be especially cautious. On the bright side, of course, there are probably fewer people in Nigerian cybercafes with bank accounts worth the effort of cybercriminals, but that is not very reassuring.

The basic problem of public computers is that they could contain any kind of malware, including the kind that can copy your login credentials (user name and password) and send them off to cybercriminals who can then use them, for example, to log in to your bank or email account. Not a happy thought.

Enter the password managers. These programs let you to store your passwords safely somewhere where others can't read them. The passwords are encrypted so that only you can get to them, with some "master key" that you know. This lets you use different, high quality passwords on your sites without being burdened with remembering them all. This in itself is quite useful, without even considering the issue of public computers.

Perhaps the biggest security problem with most people's passwords is that people tend to use easy, guessable passwords and the same password for many accounts. This is natural, since it is hard to remember different, long passwords (or better, passphrases) for each account. A password manager can generate a long, random password for you, or store the password you choose, so that you don't have to remember it.

In the past few couple of weeks, I've looked at three highly-rated password programs: RoboForm, PassPack, and Clipperz. RoboForm stores your passwords on your own computer or flash drive, while the other two store them online.

I have tried mainly the portable RoboForm, called RoboForm2Go, which stores the program and encrypted passwords on a flash drive. This gives me access to the passwords both at home and at work; I could also use the same flash drive on a friend's computer, another computer at work, or a public computer with an available USB port and have access to the passwords without installing any programs or data onto the other computer.

All three of the programs I tested were fairly easy to use, but I think that RoboForm was the easiest. The program sits in the background and automatically offers to memorize the credentials any time you open a new login page or any page with forms to fill in. The next time you open the page, it offers to fill in the fields automatically.

RoboForm Passcard Editor

How is this different from the automatic password retrieval in Firefox and Internet Explorer? First, with RoboForm2Go you can carry your passwords with you rather than their being stored only on your computer. Second, RoboForm2Go can store many pieces of data besides your user name and password, including first and last name, phone number, address, email addresses, and so on. At your command, it will fill in as much of any form as it can using these stored values. You can store different profiles and identities if, for example, you want to have one set of information for your work and another for your personal life.

Clipperz and PassPack both store only your encrypted passwords online. The advantage is that this gives you access to them from any Internet-connected computer. On the other hand, you need to trust either service enough to enter your passwords on its web page. For that matter, you have to trust RoboForm in the same way. Since all the companies have been around a while and appear reputable, this seems reasonable. Assuming the companies do what they claim, your decrypted passwords never even exist on ClipperZ or PassPack; the only thing that gets sent to the server is an encrypted package.

With either online service, to retrieve your passwords or to directly log in to a protected site you first open your Clipperz or PassPack account with your master password. The master password should be strong so that no one else can access your account. PassPack adds an added layer of protection by using two master keys: one to log in to your account and retrieve the encrypted package, and a second key to use on your own computer to decrypt the package. This means that even someone who breaks your PassPack account password and steals your encrypted package will not be able to decrypt it. It seems to me that if your master password is strong, then the added security is not that important; no one could open your account by a brute force attack, and anyone who manages to steal one password (e.g. with a keylogger or looking over your shoulder) may just as easily steal two.

Although the two work a bit differently, in essence both Clipperz and PassPack send you your encrypted package and then your own computer performs the decryption to extract the actual passwords or other data. Assuming that you have chosen an unguessable master password to unlock all the others, the only significant risk to your data is the risk that exists on your own computer: that's the only place that the unencrypted password ever occur.

All three of the programs (RoboForm, PassPack and Clipperz) allow you to select a service from your stored list and log in directly, thus functioning as a collection of bookmarks as well as passwords. RoboForm, which by default adds its toolbar to your browser, lets you click on the login button then select the page you want to navigate to, where it logs you in after entering your saved credentials.

All three programs also let you save notes in the encrypted entries, so you can store your account numbers, credit card info, phone numbers, or whatever you want. PassPack, for example, provides a note field for each entry (figure at right). Clipperz lets you choose from a variety of "cards" pre-formatted for you bank account, credit cards, address book and so on, or you can define your own fields as well as using the Note field that's included in each card.

Both of the online password managers allow you to copy your encrypted data to your own computer so that you can access it without an Internet-connected computer. Their methods are different, with PassPack using separate programs that require either Adobe Air or Google Gears to run, while Clipperz downloads a large HTML file which you open in your browser just as you do the online version.

Distinctive Features

RoboForm

• Runs from your own computer or a flash drive. You need a separate license ($) for each computer and each flash drive, though package discounts are available.
• Fills forms of all kinds from data you store in "identities".
• The easiest of the three to use when saving new login information.
• Paid version lets you store separate profiles and identities.
• Free version limits you to 10 passwords and 2 identities after 30 days

PassPack

• Stores your encrypted data online
• Two-passwords: one to access your account and another to decrypt your data.
• Although they cannot retrieve a forgotten decryption password, PassPack staff can roll back your account to use your previous password if you remember that one.
• Stores and retrieves your data as a single package; updated or new entries are not saved until you click a button to save the package back to the server.
• You can reach any of your entries quickly, even if there are many, by typing the beginning of the name into the search box.
• Free version limits you to 100 passwords (but you could open multiple accounts); yearly fee of about $15-20 for unlimited account.
• Small but growing company, with the responsiveness and accessibility that comes from that.

Clipperz

• Stores your encrypted data online
• Stores and retrieves your data as single "cards" as needed; updated or new entries are saved automatically.
• Freeware (donations accepted), unlimited passwords
• Not commercial; future development status uncertain, though product is fully-functional as is.

Which is best?

All three of these are good programs, and I think would be quite usable for most people. I found RoboForm to be a little more convenient than the others, but it's not free. I do not think that there is much difference in features and usability between PassPack and Clipperz, though I've only used them for a few weeks. Since all three programs are either free or have free versions, you will probably want to try them out for yourself to see which you prefer. There is no question that any of them will make your life easier if you want to follow good security practices and use strong, different passwords for your various accounts.

Will they protect you on a public computer?

This is a question I will discuss in the next post. The short answer is that while these products probably decrease your risk on a public computer, they do not eliminate it. There is one more service, however, called kyps (keep your password safe) that works quite differently and might be considered safe for use on a public computer.

Features Summary

	Price	Multiple Identities	Ease of Use	Offline Storage	Online Storage	Access from any Internet- connected computer	Quick lockout feature
RoboForm	$30 ($40 for flash drive version)	Yes	+++	yes	no	with flash drive version	yes
PassPack	100 entries free; $15-$20/yr for unlimited version	No (but can use multiple accounts)	++	yes	yes	yes	yes
Clipperz	Free	No (but can use multiple accounts)	++	yes	yes	yes	yes

Import/Export features

	CSV	HTML/ Printable	KeePass	RoboForm	Password Plus	Printable	JSON
RoboForm		E?
PassPack	E/I	E		I	I
Clipperz	I	E	I	I	I	E	E/I

RoboForm lists export options as Firebox bookmarks and Internet Explorer favorites. Importable files are Firefox Passwords, Outlook contacts, and various favorites and bookmarks. There does not appear to be an option to import/export arbitrary data with passwords, but I have not researched this beyond looking at what the Import and Export buttons on the menu do.

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I welcome any corrections to this review as well as different viewpoints and suggestions of different products to consider for the job.

See also

PassPack and Clipperz, head to head

Addendum and corrections arising from comments

"Also, while not native support, there is also a way to run Passpack off of a USB drive. It uses Passpack's Offline version + Google Gears + Portable Firefox: http://tinyurl.com/passpackusb"

Will a password manager let me check my email in a cybercafe?

In my last post, I said that it's basically impossible to know you're safe when using a public computer to access password protected sites (including your email), since your account information including password could be captured by a keylogger. Now I'm trying to find out if password managers provide enough security to let me go ahead and log on to my gmail account or even my bank account (now that won't happen any time soon!).

Secure password managers such as RoboForm, PassPack, and ClipperZ may allow us to safely access our password-protected accounts on a public computer. It seems to be generally accepted that they do provide protection. I'm trying out the three products above (all have a free version) but will avoid putting any financial or really important passwords online until I find out more.

These products all work by encrypting your passwords so that no one else can read them, then storing them somewhere. Offline password managers like RoboForm store your encrypted data on your own computer or a flash drive that you can take with you to another computer. PassPack and ClipperZ are online password managers. They save your encrypted passwords (and only the encrypted form) online so you can retrieve them from anywhere you have internet access. They also give you a way to save the information on your own computer for when you don't have a connection.

It sounds quite promising and the products are well-established. I just want to learn a little more to be sure that there aren't any known ways that malware could copy my passwords even if I don't physically type them.

Danger Ahead: Using the Cybercafe

Summary

Using a public computer is risky business and cannot made safe for entering or reading sensitive information including accessing your email account. You must consider the risks and benefits in any situation. The best alternatives in a cybercafe are to use a secure laptop (preferably your own), or to boot the public computer from a live Linux CD or flash drive.

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We all know that net cafes are not ideal and that they have security issues. Sometimes, though, there doesn't seem to be a good alternative. Maybe you're traveling and don't have any other way to connect. Maybe you have a home connection but it has been down for several days. Whatever the reason, you may find yourself in a cybercafe.

If you read no further, just remember this one point: never enter or access any personal or confidential information on a public computer.

Personal data that you must not enter or access includes

• Bank information, account numbers, credit card numbers and so on
• Personal identifying data such as date of birth, social security, drivers license, passport, national id, mother's maiden name, or phone number
• Email accounts and passwords
• Any other user names and passwords

This might seem too extreme, especially when you realize it will prevent you from even accessing your email. You must realize, though, that there is nothing you can do to make that public computer completely safe. Anything you type or view could be stored or transmitted to people who would love to add your information to their files. This danger is no longer an occasional problem, but common and serious.

Even if you boot from your own CD or flash drive (see below), anything you type could still be captured by a hardware keystroke logger.

Besides the risk of your personal data being captured, there is also the risk, or inevitability depending on the location, of your flash drive being infected with malware if you insert it into a public computer. Always use a clean computer with an up-to-date virus and malware scanner to clean your flash drive after using it in a cybercafe (or, for that matter, in any computer).

What to do?

Balance the risks and benefits

As in any situation, you should always balance risks and benefits. If you access your email on a public computer, there is a risk that your email account will be compromised. That means someone could gather the addresses of your contacts, email them from your own account, send spam under your name, view sensitive information (financial records, orders, addresses ...), and potentially steal your identity. That's a pretty big risk.

On the other hand, if you access your email account on a public computer in a "reputable" cybercafe and can then change your password soon afterward on a secure computer, the risk would be decreased. My own assessment of that risk-benefit balance for case would be that (a) I would only want to take the risk if it was very urgent to access my email and (b) I would try other alternatives first: SMS messages, phone contact, or whatever I could think of.

Use your own laptop

If it's possible to connect your own laptop at a cybercafe, you will avoid the problem of all the malware that could be on a public computer. Needless to say, you won't want to do this unless your own laptop is well protected with at least a software firewall (like the one built-in to XP and Vista, or an add-on) and an up-to-date antivirus program. (There are portable hardware firewalls available that plug into your USB port. But you can probably do almost as well with free software.)

Use a Linux Live CD

Using a Linux live CD or flash drive, you reboot the public computer from your own copy of Linux designed to run only in memory. The hard drive is not used and does not even need to be present. This means that drive infections are no longer a risk.

It's easy to make such a CD; you just download the file (called an iso image) and burn it to a CD or DVD. See the good article, Why you want a Linux Live CD, for some more information, or just google "Linux Live". Many current Linux installation CDs will work as well. Ubuntu (~ 700 MB) and Slax (~ 200 MB), are two examples. As these are large downloads if you have limited, expensive Internet access, you may want to copy a friend's disc or get someone to send you one (Ubuntu will mail you a free copy).

Don't be scared off by the word "Linux," either. You need no experience with Linux to use these. Just boot the computer from the CD or flash drive, and you'll see a familiar desktop with a web browser (usually Firefox), text editor, and others depending on the exact version.

Limitations of Linux Live

• The computer must be configured to boot from a CD or flash drive. If it is not, a co-operative cybercafe manager may be able to set it up for you (or you could do it yourself if you know how).
• While web browsing is almost always supported, it may be tricky to connect to the cafe's printer. But you could save what you need to a flash drive and print it later.
• Hardware keyloggers could still intercept your typing. These are devices intentionally installed between the keyboard and main computer box; I have no idea how common they are but certainly much less common than malicious software.

If you have no other alternative ... making the computer safer

It's important to stress that you cannot make the public computer safe. You can only reduce some of the risk. Kris Littlejohn lists and explains "10 things you should do to protect yourself on a public computer" including:

• Delete your browsing history
• Don’t save files locally
• Don’t save passwords
• Don’t do online banking
• Don’t enter credit card information
• Delete temporary files
• Clear the pagefile
• Reboot
• Boot from another device
• Pay attention to your surroundings and use common sense

Apart from booting from another device, as I discussed above, none of these measures will stop keyloggers from spying and reporting on everything you type. As long as you don't type anything sensitive, you'll be fine, so these precautions would help in a situation where, for example, you need to print an existing document with sensitive information, since you wouldn't be using the keyboard. And they will help in a situation where there happen to be no keyloggers or other malware intercepting what you type.